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I. INTRODUCTION
International and internationalized' criminal tribunals have
multiple aims. These include not only their core function of trying
cases, but also other, broader objectives, such as developing the legal
standards of the field of international criminal law, incentivizing
states to pursue transitional justice mechanisms, and achieving sociopolitical impact in the concerned post-conflict states. While
international criminal tribunals initially behaved as though achieving
these other aims might flow naturally from their work on their cases,
it has since become evident that these objectives require attention in
and of themselves. In this article, I argue that future internationalized
criminal tribunals should refocus more of their efforts to pursue these
goals on a natural conduit with underutilized potential: influencing
national courts in post-conflict states. Internationalized tribunals
could exponentially expand the effect of their judgments in postconflict societies if national judges in the concerned post-conflict
states were to regularly consider those judgments and treat them as
persuasive authority when deciding their own cases. This is the most
ordinary, well-accepted way that courts influence each other and,
eventually, society at large: by issuing rulings that are then adopted
or adapted by other courts. It is thus a core part of internationalized
tribunals' role as courts. In so doing, internationalized criminal
tribunals could become what we might call bellwether2 courts: courts
'-Throughout this article, I will use the terms "internationalized" and "hybrid" to
encompass tribunals, courts, and chambers that are established to hear cases of
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity and that incorporate both
international and national components. These include both independent courts and
chambers within national judicial systems. The internationalized/hybrid criminal
tribunals established thus far include the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East
Timor, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the War Crimes Chamber of the Court
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Regulation 64 panels in Kosovo, the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, and the
Extraordinary African Chambers in Senegal. There are also several purely
international criminal tribunals: the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia, the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the
International Criminal Court, See Beth Van Schaack, The Building Blocks of
Hybrid Justice, 44 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLICY 101 (2015).
2. See Bellwether, AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2004) (defining
"bellwether" as used today as "a person or thing that assumes the leadership or
forefront, as of a profession or industry." The word "bellwether" derives from the
word bell and the Middle English word "wether," which meant a castrated ram. It
originates in a medieval sheepherding practice: flocks of sheep typically had a
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who are norm leaders in a particular field, whose reasoning and
decisions are influential on other tribunals not because they must be
followed, but because other courts choose to follow them.
Effectively operationalizing this function is, however, a complex
task, both conceptually and practically. Internationalized tribunals
and domestic post-conflict courts have only a very limited formal
relationship with each other, so that any such mechanism of
rapprochement
would be entirely voluntary. Internationalized
criminal tribunals' cases and the processes by which they are heard
are highly complex, so that influence on national courts cannot be the
sole or even the primary consideration in most internal decisions
concerning case management and judgment. International criminal
trials and post-conflict legal systems are inevitably attended by
messy socio-political circumstances that further complicate the
functioning of the concerned legal institutions and any attempt at
developing transnational relationships between courts. In addition,
internationalized criminal tribunals often suffer from a legitimacy
gap vis-a-vis constituencies in the concerned post-conflict states.
Finally, internationalized criminal tribunals, like other courts, are
primarily designed to try cases.
Accordingly, I propose that internationalized tribunals could
expand their engagement with post-conflict national courts in two
ways. First, internationalized criminal tribunals should do more.
Future internationalized courts could make relatively minor, discrete
internal design choices that would make their judgments more
accessible and useful to national actors trying atrocity cases. This
would enable a form of transjudicial dialogue' between national and
internationalized criminal tribunals that is based in the core function
of courts as decision-makers and capitalizes on internationalized
tribunals' particular expertise and resources. In addition, they should
target their direct engagement with national courts where it will have

single wether as their leader, and the shepherd placed a bell around the leading
wether's neck to signal the flock's movement and direction).
3. See discussion infra Part II.
4. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication,
29 U. RICH. L. REv. 99, 112-13 (1994-95) (discussing how both types of
jurisdictions voluntarily communicate and forge a dialogue even though a formal
procedure regulating the relationship between international and national courts is
absent).
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the most impact, in peer-to-peer contacts with judges, prosecutors,
and other national court actors.
Internationalized criminal tribunals should also do less. They
should outsource other aspects of the process of influencing national
courts through persuasive authority to the extensive rule of law
networks that operate in post-conflict countries. Such networks can
offer the benefit of direct contacts with national actors and
institutions as well as expertise in working with those institutions;
these networks also have an interest in promoting successful national
atrocity trials as part of their rule of law agenda. They could also
make use of their interns and alumni to expand their transnational
networks in concert with rule of law actors without unduly taxing
court resources. In this way, internationalized courts could remain
focused on their area of expertise, trying international criminal law
cases, while enabling transnational rule of law networks to amplify
the effects of that work.
This is an appropriate time to consider these questions, because
after a period in which it seemed as though ad hoc internationalized
criminal tribunals were waning, proposals for such tribunals are
proliferating again.' The recent success of the Extraordinary African
Chambers in Senegal in trying Hiss6ne Habr6 highlights the
resurgent trend toward ad hoc hybrid institutions.' The international
community could make strategic choices in designing this new
generation of tribunals to maximize their potential influence on
national courts.
In this article, I focus solely on internationalized tribunals'
relationships with national courts in the concerned post-conflict
countries. Of course, other national courts may also hear atrocity
cases by exercising universal jurisdiction or other bases of
jurisdiction. However, it is through the national courts of the relevant
post-conflict states that internationalized criminal tribunals can hope
to produce their desired impact in those states; in addition,
internationalized tribunals have a different and more complex

5. Van Schaack, supra note 1, at 102 (listing ten pending proposals for new
tribunals).
6. Dionne Searcey, Hissine Habrd, Ex-President of Chad, Is Convicted of
War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2016, www.nytimes.com/2016/05/31/world/
africa/hissene-habre-leader-chad-war-crime.
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relationship with those national courts by virtue of their direct
connection to the venue of the atrocities and the attendant sociopolitical context. As such, it is appropriate to treat them as a discrete
case.
Also, although I use the International Criminal Court (ICC) as an
example from time to time, and although a proposal for a new
regional African Criminal Court is pending,' the suggestions made in
this article will likely be more effectively implemented by future ad
hoc tribunals that are focused on the situation in a single country.
Such tribunals will have greater opportunities for intensive
engagement with national counterparts, can more readily tailor their
judgments to national circumstances, and will be able to build
persuasive components into their structural design choices.
Part II discusses the nature of the relationships between
internationalized criminal tribunals and post-conflict national courts
and the benefits that a more robust engagement centered on
persuasive authority might provide. Part III explores the
characteristics that have enabled some courts to extend their
persuasive authority to other courts not bound to follow their legal
reasoning. Part IIIA focuses on studies of international court
influence, while Part IIIB considers how U.S trial courts have used
specialized bellwether trials to influence other courts on the national
level. Part IV concludes with discussion of the implications of this
model.

II. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
INTERNATIONALIZED AND NATIONAL COURTS
International and internationalized criminal courts share
jurisdiction with national courts over the international crimes of
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, which I will
refer to collectively as "atrocities."' The legal bases for allocation of
7. Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the
African Court of Justice and Human Rights, art. 16, A.U. Doc. No.
STC/Legal/Min. 7(1) Rev. 1 (May 14, 2014).
8. See Xavier Phillipe, The Principles of Complementarity and Universal
Jurisdiction:How Do the Two PrinciplesIntermesh? 88 INT'L R. RED CROss 375,
377, 379 (2006) (stating that crimes which are grave in nature may be prosecuted
nationally by states or internationally by international organizations and that such
universal jurisdiction allows for the trial of international crimes committed by
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jurisdiction between internationalized and national courts are often
set forth in the founding statutes of internationalized tribunals.' In
practice, irrespective of the formal structure of the shared
jurisdiction, internationalized tribunals have the resources to hear
only a few, typically high profile, cases.' 0 In this regard, these courts
exist in a potentially synergistic relationship. Internationalized
tribunals can take on a select set of cases that national courts are
unable or unwilling to pursue, and national courts provide a response
to international courts' limited capacity to hear the many cases that
arise from conflicts.
However, although national courts in post-conflict states typically
have jurisdiction to hear atrocity cases either under national law or
by applying international law, they do not always do so." There are a
variety of reasons for this, including lack of resources, unfamiliarity
with international law, and political and social pressure.' 2 When
cases are heard, there are sometimes problems in how post-conflict
national courts handle them, such as neglect or misuse of
international law, due process lapses, evidentiary gaps, or external
influence to convict or acquit.13 These impediments are, in fact, one
anyone anywhere in the world).
9 See generally Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 8, Jan. 16,
2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145. (providing for concurrent jurisdiction and assigning
primacy to the Special Court); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
art. 17, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (explaining the legal bases for the
allocation of jurisdiction) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
10.

See Judgment List, U.N. INT'L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

(Sept. 2016), http://www.icty.org/sid/10095 (demonstrating that a small number of
cases were heard by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia); see also The Cases, U.N. MECHANISM FOR INT'L CRIM. TRIB3. (Sept.

2016), http://unictr.unmict.org/en/cases (showing that the International Criminal
Tribunals generally hear a few high profile cases); Archive, Residual Special Court
for Sierra Leone (Sept. 2016), http://www.scsldocs.org/documents (demonstrating
that the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone heard the case of Charles Taylor,
the former President of Liberia).
11. See Elizabeth B. Ludwin King, Big Fish, Small Pond: International
Crimes in National Courts, 90 IND. L.J. 829, 830 (2015) (stating that trials may not
be possible due to issues such as the lack of available judicial resources).
12. See Keren Michaeli, The Impact of the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor
Yugoslavia on War Crime Investigations and Prosecutions in Croatia, DOMAC
78-79 (Dec. 2011), http://www.domac.is/media/domac-skjol/Domac-10-KMCroatia.pdf (listing the many challenges in hearing atrocity cases at the national
court level).
13. See Jane E. Stromseth, Justice on the Ground: Can InternationalCriminal
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of the primary rationales for creating internationalized criminal
tribunals. We should not, however, establish simple dichotomies
contrasting national and internationalized tribunals' capabilities.
Internationalized tribunals have experienced their own due process
problems, evidentiary gaps, and accusations of bias. 14
Also, internationalized criminal tribunals are intended not only to
issue fair judgments in individual criminal prosecutions, but also to
promote socio-political change in post-conflict societies. This
includes such ambitious goals as fostering social reconciliation,
providing a sense of justice for victims, rebuilding trust in rule of
law, creating a historical record for future generations, and deterring
further atrocities.II In practice, internationalized criminal tribunals
have found progress toward these goals to be distressingly elusive, at
least in the short-term. Indeed, tribunals (especially international
tribunals, but also hybrid courts) have found that domestic audiences
often regard them as distant, irrelevant, or even unjust. 16
Courts Strengthen Domestic Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Societies? I HAGUE J.
RULE L. 87, 91 (2009) [hereinafter Stromseth, Justice on the Ground] (recognizing
that national courts often handle cases in a problematic manner, particularly when
it comes to accountability and the state of the domestic justice system).
14. See John D. Ciorciari & Anne Heinde, Experiments in International
CriminalJustice: Lessons from the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, 35 MICH. J. INT'L L.
369, 387-88 (2013-2014) (outlining several problems that internationalized
tribunals have encountered such as methodological failures, biases, a lack of
transparency, and procedural irregularities); Alex Whiting, Lead Evidence and
Discovery Before the InternationalCriminal Court: The Lubanga Case, 14 UCLA
J. INT'L FOREIGN AFF. 207, 208-09 (2009) (stating that the inability of the
Prosecutor to disclose exculpatory materials and information material to the
defense did not allow for a fair trial); contra William Schabas, Prosecutorial
Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International Criminal Court, 6 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 731, 734-35 (2008) (explaining that the Prosecutor uses three factors
based on an ICC statute to decide whether to exercise his proprio motu powers)
[hereinafter Schabas, ProsecutorialDiscretion].
15. See James F. Alexander, The International Criminal Court and the
Prevention of Atrocities: Predicting the Court's Impact, 54 VILL. L. REv. 1, 4
(2009) (stating that one goal of the ICC is to prevent grave crimes).
16. See Public Perception in Serbia of the ICTY and the National Courts
Dealing with War Crimes, OSCE (2009), http://wcjp.unicri.it/proceedings/docs/
0SCESrb_ICTYPerception in-Serbia.pdf
[hereinafter
Public Perception]
(showing that public perception of the ICTY in Serbia is generally negative); see
also Pham et. al., So We Will Never Forget: A Population-Based Survey on
Attitudes About Social Reconstruction and the Extraordinary Chambers of
Cambodia, HUM. RTs. CTR. U.C. BERKELEY, 3-4 (Jan. 2009), http://hhi.
harvard.edu/sites/default/files/publications/so-we-will-never-forget.pdf [hereinafter
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Internationalized criminal tribunals have increasingly taken proactive
steps to heighten their positive impact in the affected societies, rather
than expecting such influence to follow naturally from their trial
activities. Many of the recent ad hoc tribunals have been organized
as hybrid courts located within the* affected state and staffed with a
number of domestic judges and lawyers, rather than as international
tribunals sited elsewhere and staffed almost exclusively with
international personnel." Internationalized tribunals have developed
outreach programs to publicize and legitimize their work with the
concerned domestic populations and to assist in the capacity building
work of NGOs and other rule of law actors.' 8
The variety of courts hearing atrocity cases also implicates another
aim of internationalized criminal tribunals: to develop the field of
international criminal law, by establishing legal standards,
procedural rules, methods of investigation and evidence
development, and so on. Over the last twenty years, the courts
hearing atrocity cases have proliferated, and so have the standards
they apply.19 Accordingly, there is also an ongoing debate about the
degree of legal integration or pluralism that is desirable in
international criminal law, and about the role of the ICC and other

Pham et. al., So We Will Never Forget] (demonstrating mixed sentiments regarding
the role and effects of the ECCC on delivering justice and the overall objectivity
and integrity of the court); see also Pham et. al., Trauma and PTSD Symptoms in
Rwanda: Implicationsfor Attitudes TowardJustice and Reconciliation, 292 JAMA
602, 608, 610 (2004) [hereinafter Pham et. al., Trauma and PTSD Symptoms in
Rwanda] (showing that those who were educated more possessed negative
attitudes toward judicial processes, rather than negative ones); see also Peter Uvin
& Charles Mironko, Western and Local Approaches to Justice in Rwanda, 9
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 219, 220-21 (2003) (stating that Rwandans and the
Rwandan government maintains a negative attitude towards the ICTR).
17. See Stromseth, Justice on the Ground, supra note 13, at 89 (stating that
direct participation of national judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, and other
personnel are an advantage of hybrid tribunals).
18 See e.g. JANE STROMSETH, ET AL., CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS? BUILDING
THE RULE OF LAW AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 263-95 (2006); Outreach
Programme, U.N. INT'L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (Sept. 2016),
http://www.icty.org/sid/242; William A. Schabas, International Criminal
Tribunals:A Review of 2007, 6 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 382, 414 (2008).
19. See Nancy Combs, Seeking Inconsistency: Advancing Pluralism in
International Criminal Sentencing, 41 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 13 (2016) (elaborating
on the unfettered sentencing discretion wielded by judges as this proliferation has
occurred, leading to wide variation in sentences).

2017]

PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY

619

internationalized tribunals in setting legal standards for the field.20
This paper does not seek to identify the optimal degree of legal
integration. Rather, it assumes that some degree of pluralism is
inevitable, in light of the inability of any one court to impose its legal
standards on another and the pluralism that has already developed
among national and international jurisdictions.2 1 It recognizes the
value both of legal integration as a means to developing a coherent
field of law, and of legal pluralism as a mode of tailoring that field to
particular states' situations and domestic legal cultures. But in order
to gain these benefits of integration and pluralism, courts' decisions
on whether to adopt shared norms or go their own way should be
informed and purposeful.
With these characteristics in mind, this paper begins from a pair of
interrelated premises concerning the relationships between
internationalized criminal courts and post-conflict national courts:
(1) that internationalized tribunals have an interest in playing a
bellwether role as norm leaders, influencing other courts to adopt
their standards and setting practices for the field as a whole; and (2)
that there are benefits in internationalized tribunals playing such a
role, particularly vis-A-vis national courts in the concerned postconflict states. Such national courts are best positioned by virtue of
location and personal jurisdiction to hear atrocity cases arising from
their own state's conflict; however, they are also likely to have
limited resources and capabilities in the aftermath of the conflict,
especially in the immediate post-conflict years. Internationalized
tribunals' decisions may enable national courts to pursue more
prosecutions by reducing the obstacles to trying these complex cases.
Treating internationalized tribunals' judgments as persuasive
authority should increase national courts' facility with international
law, whether national courts ultimately adopt, adapt, or reject
internationalized tribunals' parsing of the relevant law. In addition, a
national court might be able to adopt the practice of some
international and hybrid tribunals and take judicial notice of an
internationalized tribunal's findings on the core facts of the

20. See id. at 1-2 (stating that debates about pluralism are popular in
international criminal scholarship, particularly when it comes to international
criminal sentencing).
21. See id. (noting widespread pluralism in international criminal law).
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conflict;2 2 this would enable the national court to avoid expending
the considerable resources necessary to undertake repeated, largescale investigations into those facts. Internationalized court
judgments may provide guidance on application of due process
principles, and it could also deflect some socio-political pressure for
national courts to be able to defer to internationalized tribunals as a
source of authority for their legal, factual, and evidentiary
determinations.
If this inter-court communication becomes a dialogue, the benefits
could flow both ways. Discussion with national court judges and
help
might
court
judgments
with
national
familiarity
internationalized tribunals gain traction on national laws, norms, the
history of the conflict, and differences in legal culture and social
expectations about justice processes.23 This is particularly important
in light of the difficulty internationalized tribunals have often had in
gaining credibility with national audiences, as noted above. National
court interpretations of international law may also influence
internationalized tribunals; this exchange would make the discussion
of international criminal standards more diverse and robust and could
ultimately promote a greater degree of uniformity in interpretation of
international criminal law standards.
There are, however, three major obstacles to realizing the
advantages of such an interchange. The first stems from the formal
relationship between the courts - or, more accurately, the lack
thereof. National courts do not have to follow internationalized
tribunals' findings, nor do international courts have to take account
of national courts' judgments. For example, the ICC's
22. See generally Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice and
Admission of Evidence, Prosecutor v. Bimba, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL04-16-PT, Trial Chamber II, Oct. 25, 2005 (taking judicial notice of certain facts);
Decision on Accused's Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts Related to
Count One, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadii6, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Trial
Chamber, Jan. 21, 2014 (taking judicial notice of certain facts); see also Ralph
Mamiya, Taking JudicialNotice of Genocide: The ProblematicLaw and Policy of
the Karemera Decision, 25 WiSC. INT'L L. J. 1 (2006) (describing the ICTR's use
of judicial notice and arguing for international criminal tribunals to take judicial
notice only of previously adjudicated facts).
23. See Baylis, What Internationals Know: Improving the Effectiveness of
Post-Conflict Justice Initiatives, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 243, 275-79
(2015) (describing the utility of national knowledge for international personnel in
hybrid tribunals).

20 17]

PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY

62 1

complementarity provisions require it to defer to national courts'
prosecutions, but not to consider their legal analysis or fact-finding.24
Second, this is a non-trivial task, as the relationship between the
courts is not likely to be uncomplicated or uniformly positive.
Indeed, the existing relationship between the ICC and some African
states is affirmatively hostile, as indicated by the recent withdrawals
of South Africa, Burundi and Gambia from the ICC. 25 The final
obstacle stems from the realities of the conditions of justice systems
and modes of communication in post-conflict states: many national
courts simply do not have access to the judgments of
internationalized criminal tribunals, especially those national
tribunals that operate in rural areas or in situations of ongoing
conflict.2 6 National courts may not issue written judgments, and if
they do, they may not be widely circulated or may be produced in a
local language.2 7 So how can internationalized tribunals persuade
national courts to follow, or at least consider, their legal and factual
findings? And in turn, how can national courts participate in the
transnational development of international criminal law?

III. WHAT MAKES COURTS INFLUENTIAL?
In Part A, I will examine the factors identified by studies that have
examined international court influence, focusing on examples of
particularly persuasive international courts identified by these
studies. In Part B, I will explore how national trial courts have
influenced other domestic courts through bellwether trials in mass
tort cases in the United States. Each of these examples relates to a
different aspect of internationalized criminal tribunals' capacity to

24. See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 17,
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (explaining the legal bases for the allocation of
jurisdiction).
25. See Under Fire, ICC ProsecutorSays to Uphold FightAgainst Atrocities,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2016, www.nytimes.com/Reuters/2016/11/23/world/
Africa/23 Reuters-war crimes-prosecutor.html (discussing withdrawals).
26. See generally Elena Baylis, Reassessing the Role ofInternationalCriminal
Law: Rebuilding National Courts Through TransnationalNetworks, 50 B.C.L.
REv. 1, 57-58 (2009) (noting national courts' lack of access to internationalized
tribunals' judgments) [hereinafter Baylis, Reassessing the Role of International
Criminal Law].
27. See id. at 30, n.95 (describing the difficulty of obtaining unpublished
military court judgments in the DRC).
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influence post-conflict national courts. The identified international
courts provide an example of how to develop a functional structural
framework and communicative strategy, while mass tort bellwether
trials demonstrate how to select cases and direct legal analysis.
A. INTERNATIONAL COURT INFLUENCE
Like internationalized criminal tribunals, some other international
and regional courts have authority only over the cases before them,
and national courts are not obligated to follow their reasoning in
future cases. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and
European Court of Justice (ECJ) can demand compliance with their
judgments from the parties in their cases, but while they claim some
erga omnes effect for their judgments, they have no means of
enforcing that effect and that claim of authority is not universally
accepted; the Andean Tribunal of Justice (ATJ) and Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (IACHR) are similarly situated.2 8
However, there are considerable differences in how successful
these courts are in influencing national courts to treat their decisions
as persuasive. National courts in Europe frequently follow the
ECHR's interpretations of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms when
considering human rights issues in the cases before them, even
though they are not legally obligated to do so by the convention
unless they are party to a case decided by the ECHR on the relevant
issue.29 The ECHR itself claims status as the authoritative interpreter
of the convention, and many European states treat it as such,
although many "do not consider the erga omnes effect of ECHR
rulings to be a legal requirement."" The ECHR is also regularly
28. See Alexandra Huneeus, Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the InterAmerican Court's Struggle to Enforce Human Rights, 44 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 493,
524 (2011); see also Laurence R. Helfer and Karen J. Alter, The Andean Tribunal
of Justice and its Interlocutors: UnderstandingPreliminaryReference Patterns in
the Andean Community, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 871, 876 (2008).
29. See TIM KOOPMANS, COURTS AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 86 (2003)
(stating that under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, member states are obligated to comply with the
ECHR's judgments in the cases it decides, but the Convention does not create an
obligation for national courts to adopt the ECHR's interpretation of the Convention
in their own cases).
30. Laurence R. Helfer, The Effectiveness of International Adjudicators, in
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cited by courts outside Europe addressing human rights issues, and it
is generally regarded as the most successful regional human rights
court."' Likewise, the ECJ has succeeded in gradually gaining
credibility with the national courts in its jurisdiction. In contrast,
other regional courts have struggled to gain acceptance by the
national courts in their jurisdiction or have found the extent of their
influence to be more limited. The IACHR rarely achieves even direct
compliance with its rulings from national judicial actors.32 Similarly,
the ATJ has a stronger relationship with certain administrative
agencies than with national courts.3 3 As discussed below, this seems
to be in part due to differences in structure or strategy by the
international courts, and partly due to differences in national politics
and other external circumstances. All told, the characteristics of the
ECHR and its counterparts suggest a path for internationalized
criminal courts seeking to extend their influence with the relevant
domestic courts.
There is a growing body of scholarship addressing international
courts' persuasive influence on national courts. Anne-Marie
Slaughter and Melissa Waters have described modes of transnational
judicial dialogue that enable national and international courts to
extend their influence with each other, such as cross-citation." Many
scholars have focused on the narrower issue of national compliance
with international court judgments in individual cases, which
encompasses but is not limited to the role of national courts; for
example, Alexandra Huneeus has studied national courts'
compliance with IACHR judgments,35 and Anne-Marie Slaughter
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 464, 472 (Cesare P.
R. Romano, Karen J. Alter & Yuval Shany eds., 2014).
31. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L.
1103, 1109-11 (1999-2000) (using examples from South Africa, Zimbabwe, and
Jamaica).
32. See Huneeus, supra note 28, at 494 (finding that Latin American
prosecutors and judges rarely comply with Inter-American Court rulings requiring
their action).
33. See Helfer & Alter, supra note 28, at 876 (finding that administrative
agencies act as stronger compliance constituencies for the ATJ than national
courts).
34. See Slaughter, supra note 4, at 101-102; Melissa Waters, Mediating Norms
and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and
Enforcing International Law, 93 Geo. L. J. 487, 492-531 (2005).
35. See Huneeus, supra note 37, at 494 (concluding that national courts often
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and Laurence Helfer have examined national institutions'
compliance with ECHR and ECJ rulings.3 6 More expansively, Karen
Alter writes about the role of international courts' national
"compliance constituencies" in promoting their influence; she
defines compliance broadly to include not only literal compliance
with judgments but also adoption and implementation of an
international court's legal standards by its national counterparts
across all cases and situations. 37 Laurence Helfer has broken down
international courts' influence into several categories, including not
only compliance-oriented forms of effectiveness but also,
"embeddedness effectiveness," i.e., "whether ICs [international
courts] are effective in embedding international law and international
judicial rulings in national legal orders," 38 and "effectiveness in
developing international law" which comprises all manner of normgenerating functions including transnational judicial dialogue.3 9
Similarly Helfer, Alter, and Madsen have produced a framework for
analyzing international courts' authority that includes their
"intermediate legal authority" to persuade compliance partners "to
comply with international law as interpreted by the IC" generally,
and their "extensive authority" to "consistently shape law and
politics" in their field, in addition to their "narrow authority" to
ensure compliance in a particular case.40
These studies have identified factors that shape the relationships
between international and national courts. They focus primarily on
international courts' influence on national courts and other national
institutions; to a lesser extent, they identify modes of influence by
national judges and other national actors on international courts.
fail to comply with Inter-American Court rulings and suggesting several courses of
actions to remedy the issue).
36. Laurence Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
SupranationalAdjudication, 107 YALE L. J. 273, 276 (1997) (finding that the ECJ
and ECHR have managed to create an effective strategy that makes their decisions
as effective as national court rulings).
37 See generally KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW: COURTS, POLITICS, RIGHTS, 5, 21-22 (2014).
38. Helfer, supra note 30, at 474.

3 9.

Id.

40. See Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & Mikael Rask Madsen, How
Context Shapes the Authority ofInternational Courts, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
1, 10-11 (2016) (examining how these metrics of compliance help determine the
actual power that an international court wields).
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Each study focuses on a different aspect of international-national
engagement, identifies a somewhat different set of factors and
categorizes those factors in different ways. I focus here on
components that seem particularly salient in the context of ad hoc
internationalized tribunals and their relationships to their national
counterparts in post-conflict states. These factors fall into five
interrelated categories: structural/institutional characteristics of the
international courts; political dynamics; convergence with national
courts' interests; development of transnational networks; and the
utility and availability of the international courts' opinions. 4 1
1.

Structural/InstitutionalCharacteristics

In their theory of supranational adjudication, Helfer and Slaughter
identify several structural elements that contribute to the
effectiveness of an international tribunal on the national level by
enhancing the perceived legitimacy and capability of the
international tribunal.42 Of particular relevance for internationalized
criminal tribunals, these include judges who are recognized as skilled
experts and the capacity to effectively manage a high caseload of
significant cases; the ECHR, for example, has benefitted from the
recognized skill and expertise of its judges and its capacity to
efficiently manage a steady stream of high profile cases, although it
has in recent years developed a problematic backlog. 43 For the
internationalized criminal tribunals, these are two persistent
structural problem areas. Internationalized tribunals have proceeded
slowly with their cases, and this has affected their credibility in the
concerned post-conflict states.4 As for hiring expert judges, while
41. See Alter, Helfer, & Madsen, supra note 40, at 10; Huneeus, supra note
28, at 524; Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 36, at 285 (exploring individually
separate factors that impact the influence and clout international courts have on
national courts); see generally Helfer & Alter, supra note 28, at 911-12
(explaining, as an example, the relationship between national courts and the
Andean Tribunal of Justice in the context of IP litigation).
42. See generally Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 36, at 300-36 (expounding
on these elements that include, but are not limited to, the composition of the court,
caseload, quality of reasoning, the subject-matter, and the formal authority the
tribunal operates under, among other things).
43. See id.; Helfer, supra note 30, at 472 (documenting a backlog of pending
applications at the ECHR).
44. See Jean Galbraith, The Pace of InternationalJustice, 31 MICH. J. INT'L L.
79, 81 (2009) (describing the slow pace of ICTR and ICTY proceedings and the
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the ICC has access to many highly qualified candidates for judicial
positions, hybrid courts have historically struggled to hire judges
who are experts in international criminal law to work in the postconflict settings where hybrid courts are based.45
In their framework for analyzing the effectiveness of international
tribunals, Alter, Helfer, and Madsen identify additional structural
components that incentivize national actors to engage with an
international court, such as its accessibility to non-state actor litigants
to bring claims and the extent to which the subject matter is technical
rather than political; neither of these factors favor successful
engagement by internationalized criminal tribunals, due to the
inherently prosecutorial and political nature of the courts' work.46
However, structure alone is not determinative. The ATJ is closely
modeled on the ECJ structurally but has a more limited degree of
influence on the national courts within its purview due to the impact
of other factors, discussed below.4 7
2. PoliticalDynamics
Political pressures can play several different roles. First, there is
the role of politics in the relationship between the international court
and the political branches of the national government. The ICC has
been perceived as targeting African states as the subject of its
investigations and as basing its selection of defendants at least in part
on political considerations, and this has led to an increasingly tense
relationship between the court and the concerned national
governments in that region. 4 8 The examples of the IACHR and the
ATJ also affirm the role of political dynamics; the ATJ's sphere of

negative reaction from victims and others, but ultimately concluding that the speed
is not dissimilar to that of other complex cases).
45. Elena Baylis, What Internationals Know: Improving the Effectiveness of
Post-ConflictJustice Initiatives, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 243, 281-282
(2015).
46 See Alter, Helfer, & Madsen, supra note 40, at 17-22 (classifying these
context factors into three distinct analytical categories: institution specific context;
constituencies context; and global, regional, and local political context).
47. See Helfer & Alter, supra note 28, at 875-76.
48. See Leslie Vinjamuri, The InternationalCriminal Court and the Paradox
of Authority, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 275, 282-86 (2016) (elaborating on the
difficulties that individual domestic politics can create as international criminal
courts attempt to work collectively towards a single common goal).
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influence has been considerably narrower than its jurisdiction due in
part to lack of sufficient national political support, while the IACHR
has faced resistance from some national constituents.49
Second, there are the political dynamics surrounding the subject
matter of the legal issue. For example, some South American
administrative agencies have found that referring cases to the
Andean Tribunal insulates them from internal political pressure on
the intellectual property matters within their jurisdiction. 0 Most
atrocity trials concern actors who are deeply entangled in the politics
of their states and in the quest for peace and reconciliation in the
wake of devastating conflicts, so political pressures surrounding
these trials tend to be extremely high. Depending on the
circumstances, this can produce varying relationships with
internationalized criminal tribunals. The government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo ("DRC"), for example, was
perceived as using its ICC referral to target its political enemies; in
contrast, Uhuru Kenyatta used his ICC indictment as a campaigning
point in his favor in winning election as President of Kenya.
Finally, there may be civil society advocacy networks promoting
engagement or disengagement with the international court and/or
particular results on the merits. This played an important role in the
ECJ context; similarly, the ECHR has benefitted from a movement
towards integration in Europe and from the development of regional
institutions and the dynamics that foster participation in its regime.5 2
Of course, the significance of political pressure will also vary
according to the degree of independence of the national courts.
3. National Courts'Interests
When national courts are not required to engage with international
courts or apply international legal standards, they will tend to do so
when it serves their own interests. One such interest is in expanding
their own power. The ECJ referral system enables national courts to
exercise power by giving them control over which cases to refer,
49. See Huneeus, supra note 34; Helfer & Alter, supra note 28, at 875-76.
50. See Helfer, supra note 30, at 475.
51. See generally James Verini, The Prosecutor and The President, N.Y.
TIMES, June 22, 2016, at MM44 (detailing the rise of Kenyatta and postelection
violence in Kenya).
52. See Helfer & Alter, supra note 28, at 927.
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allowing them to gain judicial review over the executive and
legislative branches, and permitting lower level national courts to
indirectly challenge higher national court rules." If an
internationalized criminal tribunal's work enables national courts to
expand their authority over atrocity cases and thereby gain power
vis-d-vis national institutions, this may encourage national courts to
adopt international rulings as persuasive authority. However, in some
particularly fraught post-conflict contexts, such expansion of
authority may be too risky to appeal to national judges and
prosecutors.
National courts also gain some reputational benefit when
international courts cite their decisions with approval, another
practice of the ECHR and the ECJ.54 Within its decisions, the ECHR
has affirmed and legitimized national courts' domestic authority by
deferring to national courts through the margin of appreciation
doctrine and by citing conforming national court opinions. Similarly,
the ECJ deliberately developed its collaboration with national courts
by deferring to their authority within their jurisdiction, while
simultaneously appealing to them to proactively fulfill their
obligations to enforce European Community law - and to do so
based on the ECJ's interpretations of that law." In so doing, the
European courts enlisted national courts as partners with a common
goal of enforcing international law.
Of course, internationalized criminal tribunals are not responding
to national court decisions and questions as the ECHR and the ECJ
are; however, they can nonetheless cite applicable national court
decisions where appropriate, as the ECHR and ECJ have done.
Making an effort to positively cite national court opinions would
require internationalized criminal court actors to seek greater
familiarity with national jurisprudence, which would in turn serve the
ultimate goal of fostering a transnational dialogue about the
developing standards of international criminal law. In addition,
53 See id., at 892-93, 924-25; see also Huneeus, supra note 28, at 515-16
(noting that while direct review of national courts is possible, the ECJ mostly
refrains from utilizing it).
54. See Huneeus, supra note 28, at 525 (suggesting that doing so in certain
spheres helps compensate for the greater accountability that the Inter-American
Court demands from national courts in others).
55. See Helfer & Slaughter, supranote 36, at 309-10.
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internationalized criminal tribunals would benefit from learning from
their national counterparts about the factual situation, national legal
standards, and national legal culture. Internationalized criminal
tribunals are often criticized for their lack of a deep understanding of
the situations they are investigating, and greater exchange with
national counterparts could facilitate greater conversance with the
circumstances. 5 6 Particularly in countries where judgments are not
regularly published, this would also require partnering with rule of
law actors in the relevant country to gain access to the national
judgments and/or engaging directly with national judges, as
discussed in the following section.
Another national interest is in attaining guidance and clarification
on particular substantive issues, thereby making it easier to
adjudicate related cases. As such, the content and the technicality of
opinions both matter, as discussed further below.5 Finally,
depending on the circumstances, relying on the standards propagated
by an international court may insulate a national court from political
pressures, as noted above; however, identifying with international
institutions can also bring political risks.
4.

TransnationalNetworks

While citations and analysis in judgments are a key way that
courts communicate, internationalized tribunals wishing to initiate a
sustained, influential relationship with national courts will need to
put considerable resources into other connections with those courts.
This may come in the form of individual meetings, social gatherings,
organized bar associations, or other modes of interaction. Especially
in its early days, the ECJ put a great deal of effort into proactively
courting national court judges, plying them with visits, seminars and
dinners that informed national court judges about the ECJ in pleasant
56. See Baylis, supra note 45, at 245-248 (asserting that international attorneys
working in hybrid tribunals with national counterparts self-reported a more
sophisticated understanding of the national circumstances than those working in
purely international tribunals).
57 See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 36, at 309-11 (explaining that both the
ECJ and the ECHR have fashioned their opinions to reach beyond the parties in the
case and provide guidance for national courts and relevant state actors); see also
Helfer & Alter, supra note 28, at 924-25 (arguing that the real power of the ECJ
lies in the cooperation of the national judiciaries, meaning that opinions often
reach beyond the parties in the ECJ).
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environments."
It is particularly important for internationalized criminal tribunals
to form transnational networks with their national counterparts due to
their attenuated and at times contentious relationships with the
concerned states. Certainly, internationalized criminal tribunals have
been increasingly committed to outreach to their national
constituencies and capacity building aimed at local courts.59
However, much of this work has remained focused on the general
public and contact with national judges appear to have been centered
primarily on capacity building rather than dialogue over legal
standards and norms.6 0 Optimally, peer-to-peer connections with
national counterparts should be one of the first tasks of any
internationalized criminal court. These early contacts provide the
basis for a relationship of trust that can enable eventual dialogue and
debate over the substance of internationalized court decisions and
their applicability in national court settings. 6 1
Apart from these direct peer-to-peer contacts, internationalized
tribunals will want to rely on rule of law networks for other
connections. International rule of law actors maintain relationships
with national institutions as a core part of their work and maintain
extensive, active networks in post-conflict countries. Such networks
are important for building trust, sharing information, and facilitating
cross citation and cross fertilization of legal norms. Such networks
are also a primary mode of sharing judicial opinions across national
boundaries, even if such opinions are already publicly available. 62
58.
59.

See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 36, at 301-02.
See Outreach: Capacity Building, U.N. INT'L

CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/en/outreach/capacity-building

(citing

the example of the ITCY in launching its outreach section in 1999 and partnering
with the OSCE/ODIHR to transfer expertise to courts in the former Yugoslavia
through its war crimes justice project).
60. See Baylis, supra note 26, at I (noting that the ICC's early approach to
outreach in the DRC, for example, was focused on generally publicizing the
court's work through the news media and through informational sessions provided
by ICC outreach staff for national court judges and attorneys).
61. See Baylis, supra note 62, at 625.
62. See Elena Baylis, Function and Dysfunction in Post-Conflict Justice
Networks and Communities, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 625, 661 (2014)
(focusing on how the communication of international staff from these courts helps
establish prevailing norms and practices in the international tribunal community);
see also Alter, Helfer, & Madsen, supra note 40, at 29-30; Huneeus, supra note 28,
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In addition to using transnational rule of law networks,
internationalized criminal tribunals could conserve their personnel
resources by deploying interns and alumni to work with national
courts on their behalf. With several of the ad hoc tribunals shutting
down, there is a surfeit of experienced attorneys and other court
personnel who would serve as experts for post-conflict national
courts.63 In addition, there is already a transnational network of
interns among the existing international and internationalized
criminal tribunals.64 These interns often have detailed knowledge of
the intricacies of particular cases for which they have conducted
research and frequently have experience at several tribunals through
successive internships. Both national and internationalized courts
could benefit by establishing an intern circuit between an
internationalized court and its counterpart domestic courts that could
transfer information about cases and judgments between the two. 6 5
5.

Utility and Availability of Opinions

The utility and availability of international courts' opinions is not
a given. To be useful to a national court, an opinion must be on a
topic of relevance, addressing the national court's fact situation in a
manner that the national court can readily implement, and must be
sufficiently technical and apolitical for a national court to refer to it
without fear of political retribution. Finally, the content of judgments
is critical. Slaughter and Helfer emphasize the importance of "[a]n
opinion that systematically canvasses the arguments for and against a
particular position, approving some and answering or rejecting
others," thereby achieving "the recognition, albeit not the
reconciliation, of competing social, political, and economic
values."6 6 This approach is particularly critical for internationalized

at 529-30; Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 36, at 309-12, 323-26 (affirming the
importance of "awareness of audience" and "cross fertilization and dialogue").
63. Judge Vagn Joensen, Address to the United Nations Security Council:
Final Report on the Completion Strategy of the Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(Sep. 9, 2015) (transcript available in United Nations Mechanism for International
Criminal Tribunal).
64. See Baylis, supra note 62, at 661; Baylis, supra note 45, at 281-282.
65. See Baylis, supra note 62, at 661; Baylis, supra note 45, at 281-282.
66. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 36, at 321-22 (suggesting that this
method is particularly vital for atrocity cases in which horrific violence between
social and political groups is at the heart of the legal confrontation because the
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courts trying to serve as norm leaders for national courts, for it
provides the information necessary for national courts to assess and
either apply, reject, or adapt the international courts' reasoning.
Fortunately, international courts typically offer a thorough review of
the arguments and evidence produced by each side as part of their
ordinary practice.
Other theories of international court influence emphasize the
importance of another aspect of the content of the decision. The
opinion must serve national courts' interests by addressing a legal
topic of importance to them in a way that enables them to more
easily address such cases in their own docket. For example, the ATJ
has found that its primary area of influence is IP law, because the
relevant administrative agencies have gained value from seeking
clarification on vague provisions within their own international
law. 67 As discussed in the next section on national bellwether trials,
internationalized tribunals could select their cases and organize their
arguments to be of particular use to national courts hearing cases
concerning the same issues or fact settings.
These opinions must also be accessible. Depending on the national
context, this may mean more than simply publicly issuing the
opinion. Rather, it must be available in an appropriate language, and
the national court must be aware of the opinion and its relevance. In
direct compliance situations, these issues are less salient, because the
parties will be notified of the judgement. But they are quite important
where an international court is looking to extend its influence so that
its opinions are important not merely to the case at hand but also to
the national system generally. 68 It is this level of availability that is
best promoted through transnational networks of one kind or

another.69
method recognizes the losing arguments as legitimate and "signal[s] the
proponents of these arguments that they have been heard and recognized as
important participants in a debate, participants whose arguments must be
answered").
67. Laurence R Helfer and Karen J Alter, The Andean TribunalofJustice and
its Interlocutors: Understanding Preliminary Reference Patters in the Andean
Community, 41 J. INT'L L. & POL. 871,875-76 (2009).
68. See Alter, Helfer, & Madsen, supra note 40, at 29-30 (noting that
international judges often write their opinions for a greater audience with an eye to
impacting the context in which they operate).
69. See Baylis, supra note 26, at 7 (suggesting that transnational networks
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In post-conflict settings where information can be extraordinarily
hard to come by and where the internationalized court is frequently
working in a different language than the national courts, these issues
of access are paramount. The European courts make their judgments
quickly available in a variety of languages,7 0 and the
internationalized tribunals need to do the same. The ICC has
developed an online case matrix database and a set of legal tools with
the aim of making available court documents and judgments from the
ICC, other internationalized tribunals, and national jurisdictions."
The NGO Case Matrix Network (CMN) has extended this project to
tailor the software and other tools for selected national jurisdictions,
including the DRC and Colombia among others.72 This is a valuable
step towards increasing accessibility for domestic courts, particularly
because availability at the court, or even on the Internet, does not in
itself ensure ready access in post-conflict settings, where legal actors
may have no means of obtaining foreign and international judgments,
or even of knowing they have been issued. What is called for is not
merely making judgments passively available, but acting to place
them in the hands of national court attorneys and judges. For this
purpose, these sorts of partnerships between courts and NGOs enable
courts to extend accessibility without diverting substantial internal
resources from their primary purpose of trying cases. In addition to
partnering with individual NGOs, as the ICC has done with the
CMN, internationalized criminal tribunals can also make use of
existing rule of law networks which have expertise in such projects.73
All in all, studies of international court effectiveness identify a
number of characteristics that are fundamental for internationalized
criminal tribunals with aspirations to influence post-conflict national
promote the goals of post-conflict justice and rebuilding national justice system by
facilitating and encouraging communication between international and domestic
courts); see also Huneeus, supra note 28, at 529-30 (advising international courts
to use their connections within the international legal community to communicate
and establish bonds and relationships to foment change); Helfer & Slaughter, supra
note 36, at 309-12, 323-26.
70 Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 36, at 301-02.

71.

The ICC Case Matrix,

CASE MATRIX NETWORK,

http://www.casematrix

network.org/icc-case-matrix/.
72. Id.
73. Baylis, supra note 26, at 60 (elaborating on the theories regarding the
advantages of transnational networks, specifically highlighting how effective these
networks can be as law-conveying tools).
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courts. First, internationalized tribunals must put in place the basic
structural elements necessary to establish the reputation and
credibility of the court. In addition, the requisite political conditions
must exist; though often this is not within the control of the
international tribunal, the international community could take
account of this factor in determining whether to establish an ad hoc
tribunal for a particular situation. Courts must also undertake a wide
range of communicative strategies at every stage of the court's work
to develop relationships with national courts, rather than simply
producing judgments and letting national courts make of them what
they may. In this regard, three mechanisms appear to be particularly
critical: cultivating national courts' interests in engaging with
international legal standards; fostering connections with counterparts
in national courts and making use of transnational networks; and
assuring that international decisions are both useful and accessible to
national courts.
B. U.S. BELLWETHER TRIALS IN MASS TORT CASES
While studies of international courts identify the potential
structural, political, and communicative components of a persuasive
internationalized criminal tribunal, a U.S. national court practice
suggests considerations for selecting cases and for organizing
analysis in judgments. Bellwether trials are an innovation of U.S.
courts to deal with mass tort cases: a court selects a leading case
from a set of related mass tort claims and hears that case before it or
any other court proceeds with any of the other correlated cases.74 The
purpose of the bellwether trial is to establish the legal and factual
findings that set the trend for all the associated cases, as well as
providing a sense of the case's monetary value, if any. These rulings
bind only the parties to the bellwether case and are merely advisory
for the parties to the remaining cases, unless those parties have
agreed in advance to binding bellwether trials.75 By providing

74. See Manual for Complex Litigation, FED. JUD. CTR., § 22.315 (4th ed.
2004) ("to obtain the most representative cases from the available pool, a judge
should direct the parties to select test cases randomly or limit the selection to cases
that the parties agree are typical of the mix of cases").
75. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 151 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 1998) (where
the court tried 160 random cases and applied those results to over 2800 related
cases in the same class-action for exposure to asbestos).
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persuasive authority on the shared legal and factual issues and a data
point on the amount of damages, bellwether trials reduce the burden
on the courts hearing the remaining cases and facilitate settlement or
mini-trials on individual issues to resolve the remaining claims. 6
Bellwether trials have been held, with varying success, in mass tort
cases concerning harms allegedly caused by prescription drugs,
asbestos, and other products.7 7 Of course, so long as the bellwether
trial is advisory, other plaintiffs can relitigate the decided issues, and
other trial courts will not be obligated to follow its rulings, so the
aspiring bellwether court must design its case selection, trial process,
and judgment to persuade plaintiffs and other courts to follow its
lead.
Mass tort bellwether cases offer a different line of sight on the
persuasive authority of internationalized tribunals. Unlike the ECHR
and other international courts, U.S. trial courts do not share many
structural or institutional similarities with internationalized tribunals.
However, there are three critical similarities between mass torts and
the international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes. The sheer numbers involved frequently make it
impossible to try all the cases. Further, these numbers and the nature
of the acts and injuries also create enormous evidentiary and legal
complexity for courts hearing the cases. Finally, both mass torts and
atrocities as legal constructs are made up of common and individual
elements, that is, some of the matters that must be proved are shared
amongst a number of related cases, and others are individual to each
litigant. It is these similarities - and the maneuverings of trial courts
aiming to persuade other trial courts hearing similar cases - that
make mass tort bellwether trials an interesting point of comparison.
Thus, in both mass tort and atrocity situations, a large number of
people have typically been injured, often in a bewildering variety of
times, places, and manners, making investigation and proof of facts
resource-intensive and difficult.78 Both settings also frequently
76. See Manualfor Complex Litigation, supra note 74, §§ 22.312-14.
77 See In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d. 706, 712 (5th Cir. 1990) (featuring a
consolidation of over 3,000 asbestos claims into a single products liability action);
see also In re Vioxx Litig., No. 619 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div. May 12, 2004)
(concerning a class-action suit against a pharmaceutical company for the
manufacture and distribution of a drug linked with adverse side-effects).
78. See In re FibreboardCorp., at 706-07, 712 (acknowledging the extreme
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present difficult and previously undecided legal issues that require
considerable court time and attention. In the atrocity context, it is
prosecutors who choose which cases they will pursue with the
limited resources of their offices, and so it is they who must deal
with these problems of numbers and complexity. For post-conflict
national courts, even individual atrocity cases may represent an
enormous burden. In the mass tort context, where plaintiffs are in
control of the numbers and types of cases that are brought and there
are innumerable plaintiffs' attorneys ready to take their cases, it is
the courts that must take on the role of selection. Bellwether trials
operate in part as a streamlining mechanism: by adopting legal
analysis and findings of facts from the bellwether case, courts can
dramatically reduce the difficulty and resource-intensive nature of
hearing a mass tort or an atrocity case.
The other fundamental similarity between mass torts and atrocities
is that in both settings, there are some common legal and factual
issues that are susceptible of general determination. For example,
one relatively small set of twenty-two tort cases concerned the spread
of Legionnaire's disease on a cruise ship by malfunctioning spa
filters.79 A bellwether trial determined the common legal and factual
questions, including the defective condition of the filters, the
defendant's responsibility for those defects, and the appropriate
amount of punitive damages.s0 The issues of proximate cause and
compensatory damages were individual questions that had to be
decided on a case by case basis. Following the bellwether trial, some
plaintiffs went forward with mini-trials on the individual issues while
adopting the bellwether decision as to the common issues; others
settled their claims. 81
Similarly, in international criminal cases, there are legal questions
that are relevant to many cases, such as the standard for joint

difficulty and inherent imperfection in the court trying to handle mass torts).
79. Silivanch v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 333 F.3d 355, 359-60 (3d Cir. 2001)
(resulting in a claim for products liability, negligence, and breach of warranty that
garnered millions of dollars in damages).
80. Id. (affirming that a punitive damages judgment of over 4 million dollars
was reasonable).
81. See id. (Noting that while typically bellwether findings are advisory, in this
case the plaintiffs had agreed in advance that the bellwether court's determinations
on common issues would be binding).
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criminal enterprise liability, as well as factual questions that are
common to a related set of cases, such as whether a particular series
of attacks on civilians occurred and if so, how large and organized
they were. By addressing these shared legal and factual questions for
an interrelated set of cases, internationalized tribunals could create
persuasive authority on which national courts could choose to rely,
reducing their own investigative and analytic burdens. Of course,
courts hearing atrocity cases can already cite each other's legal
analysis if they wish, and some ad hoc tribunals take judicial notice
of previously adjudicated facts in other cases before the same court, a
practice that could potentially be extended to an ad hoc international
tribunal and national courts hearing cases concerning the same
conflict.82 What the U.S. bellwether trials demonstrate is how to
optimize the relevance and utility of the internationalized tribunal's
case selection and judgments, so that national courts will be more
inclined to apply its determinations.
Three overarching issues have proven particularly salient in mass
tort trials: whether the bellwether cases are sufficiently representative
of the cases national courts will hear; whether the legal and factual
issues decided in the bellwether trials are common to the other cases;
and whether it is fair to the litigants for another court to adopt the
bellwether court's legal and factual findings.83 The bellwether trial
model suggests that to maximize internationalized tribunals' utility
for national courts, such tribunals should (1) select cases that offer
significant factual and legal commonalities with a number of related

82. See generally Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice and
Admission of Evidence, Prosecutor v. Bimba, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL04-16-PT, Trial Chamber II, Oct. 25, 2005 (taking judicial notice of certain facts);
Decision on Accused's Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts Related to
Count One, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadli6, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Trial
Chamber, Jan. 21, 2014 (taking judicial notice of certain facts); Ralph Mamiya,
Taking Judicial Notice of Genocide: The Problematic Law and Policy of the
Karemera Decision, 25 WiSC. INT'L L. J. 1 (2006) (describing the ICTR's use of
judicial notice and arguing for international criminal tribunals to take judicial
notice only of previously adjudicated facts).
83. See Dodge v. Cotter Group, 203 F.3d 1190, 1200 (10th Cir. 2000)
(grappling with each of these issues in turn during complex litigation involving
claims against a uranium mill and the subsequent contamination and pollution it
caused in Colorado); see also Cimino v. Raymark Indus., at 300-01 (highlighting
the court's struggle to balance the ease of mass litigation with 7th amendment
concerns regarding the rights of individual litigants).
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cases; and (2) issue judgments that seek to elucidate those
commonalities, bearing in mind the three overarching issues
mentioned above. In particular, concerns with fairness require that an
internationalized court's persuasive determinations remain truly
advisory for future cases and that national courts affirmatively
evaluate the question of fairness in determining whether to adopt the
internationalized court's legal reasoning or take judicial notice of its
factual findings.
1.

Case Selection

To optimize the bellwether trial model, defendants should be
selected for the representativeness of their factual and legal claims,
so that the internationalized court can take a leading role in deciding
the common factual issues and legal questions that are likely to arise
in cases that the national courts may hear. Thus, the prosecutor might
select a defendant who orchestrated a particular massacre in part
because the immediate perpetrators are already in domestic custody
or at least are of known identity and whereabouts. Such a trial would
give the court an opportunity to investigate and determine the
common facts on which the national court might then choose to rely.
Alternatively, the prosecutor might select a defendant and charges
whose factual connection to other cases was more attenuated, but
whose case offered the opportunity to address critical common legal
issues, such as whether a conflict should be treated as international or
non-international, or whether certain types of militia activity against
civilians could be considered widespread or systematic enough to
qualify as a crime against humanity. Optimally, the prosecutor would
select defendants and charges that would allow for the determination
of multiple common factual and legal issues that would be of use to
the national courts. In so doing, the internationalized tribunal would
promote the purpose of encouraging and enabling national courts to
take on atrocity prosecutions. Most importantly, this approach has
the potential to have an impact beyond the immediate impression it
leaves on the public, through its influence on national trials.
To date, internationalized tribunals have focused on other criteria
for case selection, such as prosecuting defendants in prominent
leadership positions, and having representation of all the groups
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involved in the conflict amongst the selected defendants.8 4 The
proposed focus on representativeness would not supplant other
prerequisites for prosecution, but rather, could be used in addition to
those standards. These other characteristics that might be totally
commensurate with seeking out representative cases in certain
situations and not at all in others, depending on the socio-political
setting of the concerned post-conflict state. Where these interests are
in conflict, prosecutors would have to balance them in determining
which cases to pursue.
In this regard, adding a representativeness criterion would also
have the advantage of providing an additional, principled mechanism
for choosing cases to prosecute. While the factors that have been
deployed to date are useful for creating a pool of cases that meet
minimum admissibility criteria, they are ultimately indeterminate and
thus permit unexplained, and perhaps inexplicable, exercise of
discretion in case selection." A bellwether trial approach might
produce a more determinative pattern of prosecutions if it enables
prosecutors to purposefully narrow the set of potential cases that is
created by applying the current case selection criteria.
2. Investigation and Legal Analysis
As noted above, one of the similarities between mass torts and
mass atrocities is the existence of certain shared legal elements
amongst related claims, which in turn require certain common facts
to be established. Specifically, there are two conjunctive aspects to
proving mass atrocity crimes: proving the broader context and
proving the individual's action and association with that context.86
For example, to prove that a defendant committed a crime against
humanity, it is necessary to prove both that the defendant committed
one of a list of forbidden acts (murder, rape, etc.) and that his act had
a nexus to a widespread or organized attack on civilians. While the

84 S.C. Res. 1534, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004); S.C. Res. 1503,
S/RES/1503, (28 Aug 2003); Schabas, InternationalCriminal Tribunals:A Review
of 2007, supra note 18, at 387.
85 See Schabas, ProsecutorialDiscretion,supra note 14, at 736 (claiming that
prosecutorial discretion is often "ill-defined and complex," using the problems
present in the Lubanga case as an example).
86. Cherif Bassiouni, Genocide: The Convention, Domestic Laws, and State
Responsibility: Remark, 83 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 314, 322 (1989).
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question of the defendant's act and its nexus to the attack will be
individual to each case or perhaps to a few cases stemming from the
same act, the existence of the attack and its widespread or organized
character are questions common to all the cases relating to that
attack. Similarly, in war crimes cases the defendant's act must be
related to either an international or non-international armed conflict,
and to prove genocide the prosecutor must demonstrate that the
defendant's act was done with the intent of destroying a listed group
in whole or in part, a question that typically involves reference to a
group or government's plan of destruction."
Accordingly, as in mass torts, well-chosen bellwether trials present
an opportunity to resolve - or at least, to suggest a resolution for
these common facts and legal determinations rather than retrying
them in case after case. As for the individual elements, as in the mass
torts context, bellwether trials can serve a useful benchmark
function. This is particularly important in the atrocities context,
because national post-conflict justice systems frequently lack the
human, technical, and monetary resources to resolve these largescale, complex legal and factual issues." However, they may well
possess the capacity to investigate and decide individual cases once
the broader factual and legal context has been established. Thus, in
addition to providing criteria for case selection, an atrocity
bellwether trial would provide an opportunity to allocate the
obligation to deploy the funds and other means necessary to deal.
with factual and legal complexity to a single court, allowing other
courts to draft in its wake. 9 It would build from the internationalized
court's comparative strengths in legal and investigatory skills and
87 Rome Statute, supra note 9, at arts. 6-8.
88. Hill Moodrick-Even Khen, Revisiting Universal Jurisdiction: The
Application of the Complementary Principle by National Courts and Implications
for Ex-Post Justice in the Syrian Civil War, 30 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 261, 306
(2015) (Using Syria as an example of this phenomenon, explaining how the postconflict judicial system in Syria will not be able or willing to pursue criminal
investigations and prosecutions).
89 See How to Draft a Bike, WIKIHow (Sept. 18, 2016, 12:44 PM),
http://www.wikihow.com/Draft-on-a-Bike (explaining the concept of drafting as
". ... a trick where cyclists will go in single file to block the wind for the other
people behind them . .. The second rider in a drafting line uses about 23% less
energy than the lead rider, the third and subsequent riders use about 33% less
energy than the lead rider. . . . A rider in the middle of a pack can use up to 60%
less energy than the lead rider.").
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resources, and it would channel the internationalized court's efforts
at domestic impact through its core functions: preparing for and
holding trials.
Certainly, internationalized criminal tribunals already produce
lengthy opinions with thorough analysis of the relevant factual and
legal context, so in this sense, the bellwether model would not call
for a transformative change in practice. Instead, the court might
undertake some small changes in practice designed to make its
analysis more readily transferable to national courts, such as
specifically designating in its judgments the legal and factual aspects
that are relevant beyond the particular case before them and setting
out the extent of that relevance. The court might also make some
minor alterations to the structure of its judgment to place the
common factual and legal findings in separate sections from the
individual ones. This aspect of mass tort bellwether trials
demonstrates the incredible utility of what international courts are
already doing, if they select their cases with an eye to what would be
useful to national courts, and then engage in the outreach suggested
above in the discussion of the ECHR, so as to place that information
in the hands of national courts.

IV. IMPLICATIONS
For internationalized courts to succeed in developing persuasive
authority for national tribunals hearing related cases, three
prerequisite conditions must exist. First, there must be some
possibility of national trials; ad hoc internationalized tribunals should
focus on situations where, although national courts are not currently
prosecuting, they might be willing and able to do so if provided with
incentives and assistance. National courts might, for example, be
willing to prosecute low level perpetrators that did not pose such
political risks for the court as high level ones. Or a national justice
system might not have the resources to investigate large scale
atrocities but might be able to hold trials if it could make use of the
results of an internationalized court's investigation. Likewise, a
national court might not have the resources to research and analyze
novel or complex legal issues, but might be willing to adapt the
internationalized court's analysis to the facts before it. In such
situations, an internationalized court might exponentially increase its
domestic impact by influencing trials in the national court system.
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In addition, as suggested by some studies of international court
influence, the political conditions must be favorable enough that
national courts will be amenable to considering internationalized
tribunals' decisions. Atrocity trials often concern highly political
issues, and so there is little hope that a tribunal's judgments will be
treated as apolitical. But some degree of rapprochement between the
internationalized institution and its national counterparts will be
necessary for an internationalized criminal court's judgments to have
the desired persuasive effect.
Strict adherence to these conditions would also, however, mean
avoiding situations in which national courts are totally unprepared or
unwilling to prosecute, a choice which would be in tension with
another one of international criminal law's purposes: standing as a
backstop against total impunity. In such instances, the international
community and involved national actors may conclude that
preventing absolute impunity is more important; the potential for
facilitating national prosecutions is only one factor to be weighed
against the other relevant concerns. But while this trade-off between
maximizing effectiveness and preventing impunity is regrettable, I
would argue that it is, in many instances, a worthwhile one to make
in light of several additional considerations. First, internationalized
tribunals will not investigate all the meritorious situations that arise
due to their limited resources and capacity. The persuasive authority
model does not create this problem; it is merely a proposal for
choosing amongst the numerous situations that deserve judicial
attention on the basis of the other relevant criteria, by focusing on
those in which an internationalized tribunal is likely to have greater
domestic impact. Furthermore, in situations where the national court
system is utterly unwilling and unable to carry out any prosecutions,
even with external support, it is unlikely that the national
government will facilitate an international investigation and
prosecution. Accordingly, in many cases, the complete unwillingness
and/or inability of national courts to prosecute is likely to coincide
with other factors indicating that international attempts at
investigation and prosecution are likely to be stymied. Thus,
internationalized tribunals may achieve the best domestic impact in
states that are on the cusp of being able to address their own
atrocities.
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The final prerequisite is that internationalized tribunals must be
prepared to produce their judgments in a timely fashion, before
national courts have begun hearing their own cases. To date,
internationalized tribunals have been acting far too slowly to
plausibly offer persuasive authority for national courts. In order to
serve as effective influences, future hybrid tribunals will need to act
more efficiently. This is a difficult prerequisite to meet, because by
their nature international criminal trials are complex, and because a
court wishing to play a bellwether role must address the common
factual and legal issues that are particularly resource-intensive to
investigate and analyze.
Once these preconditions are met, the studies of international court
effectiveness and the U.S. bellwether trial strategy suggest several
important design elements for future internationalized criminal
tribunals. Certain structural elements, such as hiring expert judges,
and communicative strategies, such as cultivating national court
interests and ensuring the ready availability of international
judgments, will tend to promote internationalized courts' work as
persuasive authority for national courts. Similarly, internationalized
tribunals' judgments will be more useful to their national
counterparts if they resolve common factual and legal issues that the
national court would otherwise have to devote great resources to
deciding. To do so, it will be important for the internationalized
tribunal to select representative cases and to design its judgments to
make those findings useful to later courts.
The lessons from these national and international models derive
from our most basic understandings of how courts spread their
influence. They do so not merely by compelling the parties to the
case before them to comply, but also by persuading other courts to
adopt their rulings and analysis, and thereby extending their
influence throughout entire justice systems. As courts with expertise
in investigation and legal analysis in the field of mass atrocities,
internationalized criminal tribunals can most effectively expend their
energies on developing the relevant facts and law. To maximize their
persuasive authority, they should direct their activities purposefully
at the constituency they can most readily influence through their core
functions: post-conflict national courts.

